An overview of Utopia, by Sir Thomas More

 “EXCEPT ALL MEN WERE GOOD EVERYTHING CANNOT BE RIGHT, AND THAT IS A BLESSING THAT I DO NOT AT PRESENT HOPE TO SEE”.

First published in Latin, in 1516, Utopia inserts itself among those oeuvres of political philosophy that attempt an outline of the ideal form of government and societal organization. The funny thing is that the work itself is poorly organized. It is divided into two books and the second book is by its turn divided into sections, but there is no inherent correlation with content. That being said, it is possible to make out some important themes that are discussed throughout the text.

The first theme is about the ancient discussion on political life and whether one must apply himself and his wisdom to public affairs, specifically to the counselling of Princes, or reserve it to private life, and that discussion is posed as a matter of whether be a slave (or useful, “the change of the word does not alter the matter”) or maintain one’s peace and quiet. One can see in this discussion the pessimism that results from the impossibility of real change, specially through the aid of speculative philosophy, and the resorting to what is in modern times called realpolitk in the dealings of political affairs:

“go through with the play that is acting the best you can, and do not confound it because another that it pleasanter comes into your thoughts”.

Thus, good and ethical people are discouraged to participate in political activity lest they get contaminated and loose their virtue, like it is illustrated below:

“If a man was too see a great company run out every day into the rain, and take delight in being wet; if he knew that it would be to no purpose for him to go and persuade them to return to their houses, in order to avoid the storm, and that all that could be expected by his going to speak to them would be that he himself should be as wet as they, it would be best for him to keep within doors; and since he had not influence enough to correct other people’s folly, to take care to preserve himself”.

That must be the reason why Max Weber, in his Politics as a vocation, devised a different ethical and moral conduct to be observed by politicians and the political engaged. It also makes sense that Hannah Arendt preferred to not be innocent (“not wet”) instead of not standing up against the Nazi ideology.

A second theme that can be discerned is the reflection on punishment, specifically the institution of the death penalty in cases of theft. It is argued that the severity being too great, the punishment is ineffectual, a notion that can be found later in the writings of Cesare Beccaria (1738–1794). However, it can be found some absurdities in the manner of punishment proposed instead of the death penalty. It is suggested forced labour and slavery and the permanent stigmatization (the cutting a piece of the ear) of the people who commit crimes. An informed person would see that forced labour and permanent stigmatization is still practiced today, only in a different configuration. Another problem with the judiciary system of the Utopians is the legal insecurity. There are no specific laws, and every case is judged by the Senate according to the circumstances of the fact. Again, this is pretty much the case even today for the poor and people of colour.

The merit of this work on this matter is acknowledging that society’s structure must be factored in when reflecting on the penal and legal systems. Thomas More, through the character of Raphael, shows the correlation between the enclosure of grounds for sheep farming and the production of wool and the skyrocketing in the number of poor people and beggars and argues that “it were much better to make such good provisions by which every man might be put in a method how to live” instead of hanging them. And here is a compelling argument in the form of a rhetorical question:

“If you do not find a remedy to these evils, it is a vain thing to boast of your severity in punishing theft. For if you suffer your people to be ill educated, and their manners to be corrupted from their infancy, and then punish them for those crimes to which their first education disposed them, what else is to be concluded from this, but that you first make thieves and then punish them?”

That is an urgent matter even and specially today, when it is seen all manner of people (Peter Hitchens, for example) backing the criminalisation, for instance, not only of drugs but also of drug users and abusers.

Another great theme that is explored in the book is about happiness and virtue, and More draws much from the Classical and Hellenistic Greece. For the Utopians, as for Aristotle, happiness equals pleasure, but not without qualification. They account for lesser and greater pleasures and make it a point not to let a lesser pleasure get in the way of a greater one and, as Epicuro taught, do not indulge in pleasures that might draw inconveniences and a great deal of pain. But who grades that? That would be virtue, which they define as living according to Nature and believe that Nature dictates men to follow the direction of reason: “they say that Nature leads us only to those delights to which reason as well as sense carries us”. And by sense they mean the faculty by which the body perceives an external stimulus through such organs as the eyes, the ears, the nostrils. However, they do not think everything that may create some tickling in the senses are to be reckoned among pleasures, for “depraved custom” may so vitiate a man’s taste, that bitter things may pass for sweet.

But what might be a kind of blueprint for “virtuous custom”? That would be Religion. Religious principles work both as a harness on our pursuit of pleasure and support to the notion that happiness equals pleasure. They are persuaded that God will make up the loss of small pleasures with a vast and endless joy and that the pursuit of virtue will grant them a great reward.

That is fundamental for the social engineering of the Utopians, since virtue is living according to Nature and Nature inclines us to enter into society (which is reminiscent of Aristotle’s ζῷον πoλιτικόν, zoon politikon). And here lies the whole significance of this work, at least to Claude-Lévi Strauss’ humanism’s coreligionists, for it places the Universe (the Divine Majesty; see Cicero) first, and then the others before oneself.

But that is it. There is not any other advantage in the society of the Utopians. On the contrary, it contains ideas that might as well have been forwarded by communists and nazis alike and go against modern views on human rights.